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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DORIS WHITE BAGLEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs.SOCONY MOBILE OIL COMP ANY,
INC., a New York corporation,
Defenda;n,t-Appellant.

Case
No.11444

Brief of Defendant and Appellant
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action based upon an alleged breach of a
service station lease held by Defendant covering certain
real property owned by Plaintiff.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
Summary Judgment was granted the Defendant dismissing with prejudice certain of the Plaintiff's claims
for relief and concluding the lease was valid and in full
force and effect. Def end ant's Motion for Summary
Judgment was denied as to Plaintiff's remaining claims
for relief and the motion of Plaintiff for Summary Judgment as to the remaining claims was granted declaring
Defendant breached the said lease. Defendant was en1

joined from use and possession of the subject property
and a determination of damages was reserved for trial.
After trial on damages, judgment was entered in favor of
Plaintiff in the amount of $7,535.60.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment denying
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, reversal of
the Summary Judgment and the Judgment for damages
granted Plaintiff, and an order of this Court that this
case be remanded with proper instructions to grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, or such other
proceedings as the Court deems necessary and proper.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 17, 1954, Plaintiff's predecessor in interest, Lavine White, mother of Plaintiff, entered into two
written lease agreements, one covering real property, and
the other a service station and improvements (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Lease") with Defendant's predecessor in interest, General Petroleum
Corporation (General Petroleum Corporation was a
wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant and has since
merged into defendant, the latter assuming all rights and
obligations of General Petroleum Corporation, and hereinafter reference will only be made to Defend ant). The
lease provided that Defendant, for a rental of $300.00
per month, shall have the use and possession of certain
described premises, together with improvements and personal property thereon, for a period of 120 months com-

mencing with the date of completion and possession of
the improvements necessary to operate a gas and oil service station (R. 116). The improvements on the said property were completed May 1, 1955, and the initial period
of 120 months commenced on that date. As further consideration the lease provided that Defendant contribute
$7 ,500.00 to the construction of a service station and improvements on the property. The lease granted to Defendant options to renew for three successive periods of
five years each following the initial term. It was further
provided in the lease that Defendant could terminate the
lease if it determined that the operation of the service
station was not feasible by giving Plaintiff thirty days
written notice and paying one month's rent. The other
provisions of the lease set forth numerous other rights,
duties and obligations of the parties (R. 116-121).
Lavine White by Warranty Deed dated July 20, 1959,
granted to Plaintiff the property embraced by the lease.
On May 4, 1964, the lease was assigned to Plaintiff by
Lavine White.
By letter dated February 25, 1965, Plaintiff advised
Defendant that it was her contention the options to renew in the lease were ''continuing offers'' which she was
withdrawing (R. 58). Defendant replied stating that this
was erroneous and exercised its first option to renew the
lease for five years by letter dated March 16, 1965
(R. 60, 61).
Plaintiff has refused to acknowledge Defendant's
renewal of the lease pursuant to the option granted therein and commenced this action on June 3, 1965.
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POINT I
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A CONTRACT
IMPLIED OR 0 THE R WISE, BETWEEN'
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT WOULD NOT
RENEW AND EXTEND THE LEASE, NOR IS
THERE EVIDENCE OF ANY CONDUCT ON
THE PART OF DEFENDANT WHICH
WOULD ESTOP IT FROM RENEWING AND
EXTENDING THE SAME.
The first conclusion of law of the lower court states:
"By defendant's representations not to renew the
lease and plaintiff's detrimental reliance thereon
there exists an implied contract to the effect that
the defendant was bound to not renew its option
and its renewal of said option constitutes a breach
of that implied contract.''
The record is without evidence to show Defendant made
any representations not to renew the lease or that Plaintiff detrimentally relied upon any representations. But
aside from the lack of evidence, research reveals no authority whatsoever to support the conclusion or one
which even suggests that detrimental reliance on the
part of one party is sufficient to create an implied contract. If the conclusion is to be construed literally, then
we have no further argument than that already made.
However, because of the use of the terms implied contract and detrimental reliance, the conclusion may be
based upon either implied contract or estoppel, and therefore, a discussion of both principles will be made.

It is elementary that contracts implied in fact are
exactly like expressed contracts in their elements and
4

must be supported by consideration. Chwndler v. Roach,
319 P. 2d 776, Cal. App. (1968). The only distinction
between expressed and implied contracts is that the former is supported by an actual promise and the latter by
the unambiguous conduct of the parties. All other essential elements to a contract, such as consideration, consent
and meeting of the minds, are requisite to the creation of
both types of contract. 17 C.J.S. § 4, pp. 554 to 562.
Except for the lease, Defendant is at a loss as to how,
when and where it entered into a contract expressed or
implied with Plaintiff. Nothing in the record remotely
implies that the Defendant by representations, conduct
or otherwise agreed or inferred it would not renew the
lease. There is not anything in the record to show the
elements of contract were satisfied. Plaintiff approached
Defendant and negotiated in an attempt to have Defendant firm up two of its five year options to renew and raise
the rental under the lease. Defendant did not accept any
proposal by Plaintiff and Plaintiff readily admits not
only in her disposition but in her complaint that she did
not accept the proposal made by Defendant, which was
the result of her request and the negotiations conducted
between her and Defendant (R. 2, 92-P. 18). No one
could contend that such negotiations resulted in a meeting of the minds, and no one could contend that either
party consented to anything other than to reject each
other's proposal. Moreover, for Defendant to give up
its right to renew the lease, it would certainly require
some consideration from Plaintiff. The record is absolutely devoid of any facts which would even slightly infer
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or suggest that Defendant received consideration of any
kind to abandon its rights.
Detrimental reliance is most commonly an element
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. In 31 C.J.S. § 67,
p. 402, it is stated that:
"In order to constitute an equitable estoppel,
estoppel by conduct, or estoppel of pais there must
exist a false representation or concealment of material facts; it must have been made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of the facts; the
party to whom it was made must have been without knowledge or the means of knowledge of the
real facts; it must have been made with the intention that it should be acted on; and the party
to whom it was made must have relied o:µ or acted
on it to his prejudice.''
Further in the same section at pages 406 and 407, it is
stated that :
''There can be no estoppel if any of the requisite
elements thereof are wanting. They are each of
equal importance.''
In Kelly v. Richards, et al., 83 P.2d 731, 95 Utah 560,
(1938), at page 734, the court stated:
"It is essential therefore that the representation,
whether it arises by words, acts or conduct, must
have been of a material fact; that it must have
been wilfully intended to lead the party setting up
the estoppel to act upon it or that there must have
been a reasonable grounds and cause to think that
because thereof he would change his position or do
some act or take some course on faith in the conduct and that such action results to his detriment
if the person sought to be estopped may not re-
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pudiate the words of interpretation being placed
upon such conduct.''
A party raising estoppel must have relied to his loss,
upon misrepresentation or conduct amounting to misrepresentation or concealment of material facts. Cook v.
Cook, 174 Pac. 434, 110 Utah 406, 1946.
In Petty v. Gindy MatY/!Ufacturing Corporation, 404
P .2d 30, 17 Utah 2d 32, 1965, this court in ref erring to requirements of promissory estoppel stated, at page 32:

'' ... the promise or representation relied on must
be sufficiently definite and certain that promissee
acting as a reasonable and prudent person under
circumstances would be justified in placing reliance upon it and, in case of an uncertainty or
doubt, responsibility is upon a promissee to ascertain facts before acting upon it.''
Plaintiff has not shown that she relied upon any particular conduct of the Defendant; nor has she shown that
she has relied upon conduct of defendant to her loss. If,
as Plaintiff claims, she relied upon Defendant not exercising its option to renew the lease, she would have had
no need whatsoever to send a letter to Defendant advising it that the options to renew in the lease were nothing
more than continuing offers which she was rescinding.
The letter was silent as to any reliance by her upon
any conduct or representation of Defendant or that
she had a contract, implied or otherwise, with the Defendant whereby the latter had contracted away its right to
renew. Obviously, there had been no meeting of the
minds or consent.
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To establish estoppel, Defendant must have intended
or, at least assumed, that Plaintiff would have acted in
the way she claims to have. If such evidence appears in
the record, Defendant would appreciate having its atten.
tion drawn to it.
Whatever inferences or acts Plaintiff claims to have
relied upon are not apparent and obviously not definite
and certain. It would thus seem only reasonable and prudent that prior to obligating herself, if she had, Plaintiff
would have obtained assurances as to Defendant's intentions.
Thus, under any of the discussed theories, it is evident there is neither law nor fact supporting a conclusion
that Defendant was bound by implied contract not to renew or was estopped from renewing the lease because of
Defendant's representations or conduct or for any other
reason.
POINT II
A PROVISION IN THE LEASE GRANTING
DEFENDANT THE OPTION TO TERMINATE
THE LEASE UPON GIVING 30 DAYS' NOTICE AND PAYMENT OF ONE MONTH'S
RENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LACK OF
CONSIDERATION OR MUTUALITY SO AS
TO RENDER THE ENTIRE LEASE NULL
AND VOID.

It is a well established rule that where a contract is
supported by other than mutual promises of the parties
the right to cancel or terminate the contract at any time
8

by only one party is valid and enforceable. This principle
is clearly stated in 17 C.J.S., § 100 (6), page 807, as
follows:
''Where a contract is supported by a sufficient
consideration the fact that, under its terms, a
right to cancel or terminate is given to one or both
parties does not render it invalid or unenforceable for lack of mutuality.''
At page 808 of the same section it states:
''A contract may be valid and not wanting in
mutuality even though it gives a right to cancel
where such right must be exercised by an affirmative act, regardless of whether cancellation must
be for cause. So, a contract under which one or
both parties reserves a right or option to terminate on giving reasonable notice, or a stated notice
. . . has been held not illusory and without effect
for lack of mutuality.''
A recent case on this point is K eek v. Brookfield, 409
P.2d 583, 2 Ariz. App. 424 (1966). In that case, which is
in point here, lessor argues that a lease was void for lack
of mutuality because it provided that lessee had the right
to terminate upon the giving of 30 days' notice. In
reply to that contention the court at page 586 said:
"Mutuality is absent when only one of the contracting parties is bound to perform. Where
there are mutual promises between the parties, as
there are here, it is not necessary to render a particular promise by one party not binding that
there be a special promise on the part of the
other party directed to that particular obligation.
Taylor v. Kingman Feldspar Co., 41 Ariz. 376,
381, 18 P. 2d 649 ( 1933). There being sufficient
consideration, the validity of the lease is not af9

fected by the fact that the lessees had an option
to terminate while the lessors had no correlative
right.''
In the instant case, the position of Defendant is even
stronger than that of the lessee in the Keck case. A reading of the lease readily shows the parties here not
only had several mutual promises and consideration
supporting the agreement, but also, with regard to
the specific termination provision, Defendant had to
give Plaintiff a 30 days' written notice and payment
of one month's rent before termination could be
effective. Additionally, Defendant could only terminate the operation of the service station if it became unfeasible. The fa.ct that feasibility is a condition to Defendant's termination of the lease would require Defendant to act in good faith and, if necessary,
prove that operation of the station was not feasible.
This court has stated in Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy,
237 P. 2d 823, Utah (1951), that a clause giving one party
the right to terminate upon a stated notice does not make
the contract unenforceable for lack of mutuality. The
fact situation in that case differs in the instant case in
that both parties had the right to terminate, but thi~
Court recognized in discussion of the question of the
right to terminate that it was not necessary to the validity of the contract to provide both parties with that
right.
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POINT III.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A
FINDING OF AN IMPLIED COVENANT TO
INCREASE RENTAL OR SHARE PROFITS
UNDER THE LEASE.
The law governing implied covenants has long been
established by the courts, and it may be stated generally
that courts do not favor implied covenants and will declare them to exist only if necessary. Gou.sins Investment
Company v. Ha.sting Clothing Company, 113 P.2d 878, 45
Ca. 2d 141 (1941). In the often cited Gou.sins case, the
California Court said, at page 882, the rules controlling
exercise of judicial authority to assert implied covenant
may be stated as follows:
''The implication must arise from the language
or it must be indispensable to effectuate intention
of parties ; it must appear from language used
that it was so clearly within the contemplation of
the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to express it; implied co-venants can only be justified
on grounds of legal necessity; a promise can be
implied only where it can be rightfully assumed
that it would ha-ve been made if attention had been
called to it; there can be no implied covenant
where the subject is completely covered by contract.''
The California court went on to quote at great length
from another noted case, Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty Co., 117 Tex. 439, 6 S.W.2d 1039,
(1941) 60 A.L.R. 890. The quote is as follows:
''The court cannot make contracts for parties, and
can declare implied covenants to exist only when
11

there is a satisfactory basis in the express contracts of the parties which makes it necessary to
imply certain duties and obligations in order to
effect the purpose of the parties in the contracts
made. Before a covenant will be implied in the
express terms of a contract, and in some cases in
view of the customers and practices of the business to which the contract relates, it must appear
therefrom that it was so clearly in the contemplation of the parties as that they deemed it unnecessary to express it, and therefore omitted to do so,
or that it is necessary to imply such covenant in
order to give effect to and effectuate the purpose
of the contract as a whole. The Supreme Court
of West Virginia, in the case of Grass v. Big Creek
Developmen.t Co., 75 W. Va. 719, 84 S.E. 750,
L.R.A. ( 1915), 1057, states the rule as follows:
'Implied covenants can only be justified upon
the ground of legal necessity. Such a necessity
may arise out of the terms of the contract or out
of the substance thereof. One absolutely necessary to the operation of the contract and the effectuation of its purpose is necessarily implied
whether inferable from any particular words or
not. It is not enough to say it is necessary to make
the contract fair, or that it ought to have contained a stipulation which is not found in it, or
that, without such covenant, it would be improvident or unwise or would operate unjustly; for
men have the right to make such contracts. Accordingly courts hesitate to read into contracts
anything by way of implication, and never do it
except upon grounds of obvious necessity.' "
It certainly cannot be said that the language of the
lease gives rise to the implication that Plaintiff is entitled
to additional rentals or a sharing of profits. Not only
does the lease provide that it embodies expressly all
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agreements between the parties, but it is completely silent
and without any reference to what Plaintiff contends, and
silence on the point cannot be assumed to raise implications. We submit the lease was intentionally silent as
to Plaintiff's claim because neither of the parties intended such a provision to be included. It can hardly be assumed that it was a point considered to he unnecessary
to express. One would have to believe that a party entitled
to share profits or adjust remuneration would include the
point in an agreement. If the rental was to be increased
or profits shared, what would be the basis to calculate the
amounts to be paid? Plaintiff cannot deny that the lease
received the scrutiny of the original parties. An examination of the document itself shows that many words, sentences and paragraphs were added to or deleted from the
basic form used for the agreement.
Although implied covenants are raised by the
language of a ontract and extraneous factors are not
to be considered, Defendant contends that even the
conduct of the parties opposes Plaintiff's position.
It is significant that during ten years of the nntial term of the lease, the stated monthly rental was
paid hy Defendant and neither Plaintiff nor her
mother made the contention proposed here. In fact,
until Plaintiff refused to recognize Defendant's exercise
of its option to renew, the parties seem to have acted in
accordance with the lease's clear and unambiguous language. Thus, it appears obvious the parties bad expressed their understanding of the lease by their own
conduct over a period of several years.
13

Defendant submits that Plaintiff's real contention is
that she is no longer satisfied with her bargain and now
is of the opinion that it is unfair to her. If this is true,
Plaintiff is still without standing under the Law. As
stated in the Cousins Investment Company case it is not
enough to say covenants should he implied because a contract is unfair or no longer satisfactory to one party. It
is hornbook law that a party cannot rescind or alter a
contract on the grounds that he believes it to be a bad
bargain or the consideration is no longer adequate. The
courts have long held that parties suffering no disabilities
are in a better position to determine the adequacies of
their own contract, and the courts hesitate to interfere.
17 Am J ur 2d 102, § 102, p. 445 to 448.
CONCLUSION
The lower court has apparently entered Summary
Judgment for Plaintiff only on the three points argued in
this brief. The law is clear as to what facts must exist
under point one to find for Plaintiff. However, Evidence
to support Plaintiff's contention that Defendant by implied contract or estoppel was barred from renewing and
extending the lease is completely absent from the records.
We have often echoed that in our argument, but the only
fact is that there a re no facts. Nothing more can be said
and we find no reason to elaborate further.
As to our points two and three the law is clear as
to what facts must exist to support Plaintiff's claims.
Defendant also believes that the record is complete and
clear in that the lease itself is really all Plaintiff has
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asked to have interpreted. The certainty of the language
relating to Defendant's option to terminate is not in question. Plaintiff's contention that the lease lacks mutuality
is met squarely in K eek v. Brookfield and is denied by
this court in Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy. Aside from
numerous mutual promises between the parties and the
rental paid by Defendant, there is separate consideration
for that right and the necessity of Defendant to satisfy a
condition before exercising it.
In regard to the finding of implied covenants, there
is a stated rental and no inference to rental adjustment
or profit sharing. The intention of the parties is expressed, as are their rights and duties. Nothing more is
required of either party than can be reasonably determined from a reading of the plain language in the lease
and nothing more should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE E. BOSS, ESQ.
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorney for DefendantAppellant Socony Mobile
Oil Company
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